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Launched in March 2012, the African Peacebuilding Network 
(APN) supports independent African research on  conflict-affected 
countries and neighboring regions of the continent, as well as the 
integration of high-quality African research-based knowledge into 
global policy communities. In order to advance African  debates on 
peacebuilding and promote African perspectives, the APN offers 
competitive research grants and fellowships, and it funds other 
forms of targeted support, including strategy  meetings,  seminars, 
grantee workshops, commissioned studies, and the publication 
and dissemination of research findings. In doing so, the APN 
also promotes the visibility of African peacebuilding knowledge 
among global and regional centers of scholarly analysis and 
practical  action and makes it accessible to key policymakers at 
the United Nations and other multilateral, regional, and national 
 policymaking institutions. 
“African solutions to African problems” is a favorite mantra of the 
African Union, but since the 2002 establishment of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture, the continent has  continued 
to face political, material, and knowledge-related  challenges 
to building sustainable peace.  Peacebuilding in A frica has 
 sometimes been characterized by interventions by  international 
 actors who lack the local knowledge and lived experience 
needed to fully address complex conflict-related issues on the 
 continent. And  researchers living and working in Africa need 
additional  resources and platforms to shape global debates on 
 peacebuilding as well as influence regional and  international 
 policy and  practitioner audiences. The APN Working Papers 
 series seeks to address these knowledge gaps and needs by 
 publishing  independent research that provides critical overviews 
and reflections on the state of the field, stimulates new thinking 
on overlooked or emerging  areas of African peacebuilding, and 
engages scholarly and  policy  communities with a vested interest 
in building peace on the  continent.
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1The Niger Delta region, with an area of about 70,000 square kilometers, 
is Africa’s largest delta and the third largest in the world (World Bank 
1995). Although the region is geographically made up of the Bayelsa, Delta, 
and Rivers States in Nigeria (Willinks Commission 1958), its geopolitical 
 definition has extended to all the states that produce oil within the southern 
part of the country. These include, in addition, the Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross 
River, Edo, Imo, and Ondo States (NDDC 2004). 
In fact, the Niger Delta has largely been defined by the natural resources 
with which the region is endowed since its indigenous people’s first contact 
with Europeans. Initially,  its seaside towns served as ports for the  shipping 
of slaves from hinterland Nigeria across the Atlantic. After the slave trade 
was abolished, the region served as a point of contact during the “ legitimate” 
trade carried on in natural resources, particularly palm oil and rubber (Obi 
2010).  
Today the Niger Delta remains at the heart of the Nigerian economy, as it 
produces crude oil, which is the economy’s mainstay. The region  produces 
an average of two million barrels of crude oil per day, and its reserves stand 
at 30 billion barrels, with prospects for growth. The region also has  abundant 
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reserves of natural gas, amounting to about 166 trillion standard cubic feet. 
These resources give it strategic importance in a  global  political economy 
that depends on energy from fossil fuels (National  Petroleum  Investment 
Management Services 2014).
Intense competition for the control of these resources has led to  disputes 
between indigenous, national, and international actors. While the 
 international actors have often represented the extractive industries in the 
prevailing global energy economy, national actors who are not indigenous 
to the region struggle to maintain legal control of its resources through the 
 instrumentality of the Nigerian state. This control is designed to maintain 
the state and preserve the primary revenue stream of the ruling class that 
sits at the top of the country’s patronage system.
In short, the history of resource extraction in the Niger Delta is a history 
of conflict, as every epoch, from the palm oil trade to the crude oil trade, 
has put the people and the state (or sovereign authority) in conflicting— 
often violently conflicting—positions. This struggle for resources between 
the  local people and those who seek to exploit their resources has shaped 
the  formation of the society and state in the region by shaping authority 
and  societal relations (Alagoa 1970). In turn, the conflicts themselves have 
evolved from one resource epoch to the next (Obi 2010; Ako and Okonmah 
2009). 
The study of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta has concentrated on the 
 insurgency that took place in the region between 2005 and 2009 (Watts 2007; 
Courson 2009), just as the peacebuilding efforts directed at resolving the 
conflict have focused there. The attention has been on the confrontations 
between armed rebels and the state armed forces. Here I argue that the 
insurgency’s labeling as an “oil conflict” has had an impact on the scholar-
ship of the conflict as well as on the peacebuilding efforts. In fact, the con-
flicts in the Niger Delta go beyond a rebel-state dimension, and the other 
dimensions are crucial to sustainable peacebuilding. The rebel groups in 
the region did not arise spontaneously from conflicts induced by grievances. 
Instead,  other forms of violent conflict, predating those between the rebels 
and the state, provided the opportunities for their emergence. I argue that 
these other forms of conflict are still prevalent in the Niger Delta region, 
even though the rebel-state confrontations have been put on hold by the 
 amnesty and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
program  introduced by the federal government in 2009.
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THEORETICAL CLARIFICATIONS
Violent conflicts, political violence, and the mobilization of armed groups 
have been topical among social scientists, whose engagement with these 
issues has produced a burgeoning body of literature. Prominent in the dis-
course is a debate that presents greed and grievance, respectively, as the 
dominant variables determining armed mobilization and the outbreak of 
violent conflicts. The arguments for the first variable—greed—hold that 
actors in violent conflicts are motivated by the consequential  benefits of 
 participating in them, and this increases the likelihood of their outbreak 
( Collier and Hoefler 2004; Berdal and Malone 2000; Reno 2000). The 
 arguments for the second suggest groups are mobilized into violence as 
a result of longstanding grievances and unresolved latent conflicts. This 
strand of the conflict literature has been enriched by research on relative 
 deprivation and horizontal inequalities as causes of violent conflicts (Brush 
1996;  Douma 2006; Stewart 2002).
The greed and grievance theses have enhanced the understanding of violent 
conflicts and the mobilization of armed groups. A consensus is  emerging, 
however, that they do not provide a nuanced view. On the greed thesis,  Ukoha 
 Ukiwo wrote that 
the so-called “new political economy perspective” is replete 
with too much economism, too little politics and no history 
at all. This is partly because there is no attempt to put the 
 so-called elite kleptocracy and mass opportunism in their 
proper social contexts. (2009: 2) 
Similarly, Cyril Obi (2010) has explained that the study of  violent conflicts 
within clear-cut binary lines of greed and grievance does not  adequately 
capture the fluidity of such phenomena as criminality and  dissent. 
This essay calls, therefore, for a more contextualized study of conflicts, as 
the focus on linear factors does not sufficiently explain them; rather, the 
multidimensional nature of most is captured by the complexity of politics 
and the multiplicity of narratives that define history. To understand conflicts 
and effectively build peace, policymakers and scholars need to deconstruct 
the politics and history of the context in which each takes place—a process 
that will facilitate the understanding of the fault lines inherent in societies 
experiencing them.
4SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL | WORKING PAPERS EBIEDE | BEYOND THE REBELLION
The heterogeneous nature of violence in given contexts of conflict  creates 
different narratives of the issues in particular cases. Yet, some issues 
 receive more attention than others. Often, scholars and policymakers 
 focus on a predominant narrative as they deem fit, while downplaying or 
paying less attention to others that are part of the conflict dynamics. The 
tendency toward a selective disposition to certain narratives while  ignoring 
others in attempting to understand violent conflicts has been theorized by 
 Stathis Kalyvas (2003), who noted there is often a “master cleavage” behind 
 political  violence (civil wars in particular), but that actual violence  manifests 
as private  vertical conflicts between individuals and groups within a giv-
en  community. This view presents violence during conflicts as a mixed bag 
 involving multiple actions. 
The plausibility of Kalyvas’s argument has been confirmed by others 
who have argued that the drivers of violent conflicts at one level are not 
 necessarily what drive them at another (Regan and Norton 2005). The 
 different factors that account for violence in a given conflict—the conflict’s 
dynamism and fluidity—need to be taken into account to understand the 
complex  narratives behind it. In the Niger Delta, Gore and Pratten (2003: 
211–40) identified different narratives that fuel youth movements and lead 
to insurgency,  criminality, engagement, and complicity with the state. Yet 
what is predominantly seen and discussed is the overarching violence 
 associated with militancy or rebel-state violence in the region—that is, the 
“master cleavage.” 
The “master cleavage” of the violent conflict in the Niger Delta has been 
conceptualized around the rebel-state violence mainly because it  directly 
affects the oil industry. Conflict in Nigeria, a typical petro-state, poses a 
direct threat to the oil industry—the mainstay of the country’s economy. 
 Consequently, state response to the violence has concentrated on  protecting 
oil industry operations, as well as on the cessation of violence targeting 
the industry. Globally, the rebel insurgency in the region fits well into an 
 ongoing discourse on rebel groups and natural resources. The study of the 
region has been influenced by these global intellectual agendas, and the 
local and international response to the violence there has been shaped by 
the presence of oil and rebel groups.
What this focus on rebel-state violence overlooks is the literature on the evo-
lution of militant groups in the Niger Delta. Studies note that the oil  rebels 
originated as political thugs and members of ethnic militias,  fraternal cults, 
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and criminal syndicates (Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007; Joab-Peterside 2007; 
 Nyiayaana 2011). Indeed, elements of all of these precursors are found in 
the character of most militant groups in the region. As will be explained, 
however, the emergence of rebel groups did not decisively resolve the other 
violent conflicts in which their members had been prominent actors. In-
stead, rebel violence pushed these other conflicts into the background and 
took center stage, leading to a failure to address the other sources of con-
flict and a consequent negative impact on long-term peacebuilding in the 
region.
TYPES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA
The struggle for natural resources in the Niger Delta has not only pitted the 
people against the state; it has also created internal conflicts that form part 
of the overarching conflict narrative in the region. Apart from the  rebel-state 
dimension, communities are divided by intracommunal,  intercommunal, 
interethnic, political, and criminal violence, with rebel groups featuring 
prominently (see table 1). Even as armed hostilities between the state and 
the rebel groups have been drastically reduced, the other forms of conflict 
have not been decisively resolved. 
By examining each type of conflict in turn, the sections below attempt to 
demonstrate that the mobilization of rebel groups to confront the state is 
actually the outcome of other dimensions of conflict that policymakers in 
the region have ignored.
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TABLE 1: Types of Violent Conflict in the Niger Delta
Type of violent conflict Key actors Issues
Rebel-state Rebels, military, and oil 
multinational companies
Oil rents and rights
Intracommunal Chiefs, youth groups, and 
armed militias
Community governance, 
chieftaincy tussles (power 
struggles), and land
Intercommunal Chiefs, youth groups, and 
armed militias
Land, power struggles, and 
oil rents
Interethnic Chiefs, youth groups, and 
armed militias
Land, power struggles, and 
oil rents
Political violence Youth groups, political 
interest groups, and armed 
gangs
Elections, political interests, 
and power struggles
Criminal violence Fraternities, armed gangs, 




Conflicts within communities involve different factions of the ruling groups 
(chiefs) and youth groups. Often about power and land, in some cases they 
involve a struggle for control of community resources or disagreement over 
how the resources are shared. The frequent use of violence in these  local 
struggles creates the foundation for groups to be mobilized for further 
 violence in some communities. 
One community where such use of violence has occurred is  Peremabiri, 
in the Southern Ijaw local government area of Bayelsa State. In 1998, 
 intracommunal conflicts between different factions over control of the 
 leadership of the community led to a deadly conflict. Community youths, 
 mobilized by chiefs who were in disagreement over how to manage  payments 
from the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC),1  engaged in 
 factional confrontations that led to the deaths of over thirty young people.2 
The first confrontations led to the emergence of the first sets of armed youth 
groups in Peremabiri community.
Starting from disagreements over distribution of compensation payments 
from SPDC, the conflict morphed into a disagreement over the  rightful 
 leadership for the community,3 involving two youth factions. Most of those 
actively involved in the struggle were aligned with one of these factions, and 
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the ascendancy of one would mean the expulsion from the  community of 
key members of the other. This made the struggle even more desperate and 
intense. 
In 1999, members of one of the youth factions organized themselves to 
overthrow the community leadership. They succeeded. The ensuing conflict 
led to the destruction of the properties of those considered to be aligned 
with the opposition leadership and also the death of over twenty community 
members.4 In one case, a house was burned because its owner was said to 
be the uncle of a prominent member of the opposing youth group. 
The continuous violent conflict in Peremabiri led to the intervention of the 
state government, which set up a judicial commission of inquiry to look 
into the claims of the opposing parties. The commission sat for two weeks 
and did not produce any report.5 The failure to uncover any evidence that 
could have led to the indictment of those who committed atrocities in the 
village generated more grievances among those whose families suffered 
 casualties. 
The emergence of armed youth groups and the exile of some  community 
youths, including the youth who had led his group to take over the  community 
in 1999, took on a different dimension when group members started to 
 engage in organized criminality.6 Community members recounted how 
youths involved in communal violence turned to criminal activities on the 
neighboring rivers in the region,7 which led to regular incidents of sea 
 piracy. A full-fledged criminal group that appeared in Diebu, a neighboring 
community, was led by an indigene of Diebu but had support from some 
members of the youth faction that had hijacked Peremabiri’s leadership in 
1999, according to residents of that community. The Diebu group continued 
to operate for about two years without any intervention by Nigerian security 
agents, terrorizing local community people and traders traveling on the riv-
er Nun and its tributaries, and heightening the sense of insecurity among 
the villagers and travelers in the area.
These criminal groups operated up to the point of the emergence of armed 
rebellion in other parts of the Niger Delta. Although some youths left Die-
bu to join militants in Western and Eastern Niger Delta,8 the Diebu group 
did not itself evolve into a full-fledged militant group. It was not affiliated 
with any of the umbrella platforms of militancy, such as the Movement of 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Volunteers 
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(NDV), or the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and it did not 
attack oil facilities in the area; its focus was mainly on organized  criminality. 
 Consequently, it gained less recognition than the larger militant groups 
from the media and even the state.
In September 2007, the Diebu group held a member of another militant 
group, one based in Ologbobiri, hostage along the Diebu creek. The  member 
was returning from Yenagoa, where he had gone to negotiate the release of 
some hostages held by his group. He had thirty million naira9 in the boat, 
a ransom payment for the hostages. According to him, he was held for 
three hours in Diebu. He convinced the leader of the Diebu group that his 
own group would not seek retaliation against the Diebu leader if he were 
 allowed to go unharmed.10 That the leader agreed to release him after this 
 reassurance is plausible because the Diebu group, having fewer  weapons 
than the Ologbobiri-based militant group, would have wanted to avoid a 
conflict. Both Diebu and Ologbobiri are in Southern Ijaw Local Government 
area, but the Ologbobiri-based militant group was more dominant in the 
area. Had the Diebu group harmed the member of the  Ologbobiri-based 
group, it would have attracted a  direct  confrontation, which might have led 
to disastrous consequences for the smaller group. This situation highlights 
the fluidity of violence and  interface between different groups in the region. 
In this case the Diebu group, a smaller  organization identified with crimi-
nality against the local people, recognized its  limitations when dealing with 
the area’s dominant armed group and  other groups  directly involved in the 
insurgency. 
The operations of the criminal group in Diebu came to an end following an 
attack on it by Firstman Pere,11 a leader of one of the armed groups involved 
in communal violence in Peremabiri. Pere had been part of the Diebu gang 
but had parted ways with its leader, Gibson Kala (aka Prince  Igodo) ( CEHRD 
2008). Although some accounts suggest the conflict  between Pere and 
 Gibson Kala grew out of a disagreement over a ransom payment ( CEHRD 
2008), it is important to note that the Diebu group had not carried out any 
kidnapping at the time. What had actually happened is that the Bayelsa State 
government had established the Bayelsa State Peace and Conflict Resolu-
tion Committee (BSPCR), a duplicate of a federal government committee 
established to negotiate with rebels operating in the region. The Bayelsa 
State committee patronized armed groups to ensure they did not attack the 
oil industry, providing them with cash payments and other benefits often 
disbursed as “security allocations” and giving them boats. The group at 
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Diebu was paid as well, even though it had no known affiliation with the 
recognized militant groups in the region and had not directly attacked oil 
installations or workers. 
While it may be argued that the payment to the Diebu group was  precautionary, 
it generated conflicts that led to more violence within both the group and the 
community. The fallout between Pere and Gibson Kala was an outcome of 
disagreements over the distribution of funds from the BSPCR12 that forced 
Pere to leave the Diebu group with some others he had brought to it and 
later join Ateke’s militia, the NDV, in Rivers State. When, in June 2008, Pere 
returned to attack Gibson Kala and other  members of his gang,  Kala died 
in the process and Pere took control of the area,  establishing a rebel camp 
that he named after the NDV. 
After the successful decimation of the Gibson Kala group and the 
 establishment of the NDV in Diebu, Pere returned with his newly  established 
group to Peremabiri, his hometown, and seized a community space—the 
Teachers Training College facilities—to establish a base there. This is one 
of the few cases in which a rebel group existed inside the community rather 
than in a camp in the forest.
The progression of Pere from a factional leader of communal violence 
to leader of a militant group had an impact on the communal conflict in 
 Peremabiri. Other youth members of his faction were also recruited into 
his armed rebel group. Their return to the village as armed rebels made it 
impossible for the victims of their previous violence to confront them. Also, 
their new status as an armed rebel group that fed into the popular Niger 
Delta narrative of rebellion gave them the leverage to claim leadership of 
the community. Thus, what they could not have achieved easily as factional 
members of  community-based militias they had successfully achieved as 
armed rebels “fighting the Niger Delta cause.” The contradiction this  creates 
in the  conflicts in the region has an impact on the entire  peacebuilding 
 process. This will be discussed in the section on  peacebuilding.
Intercommunal Conflict
Intercommunal conflicts involve more than one community. In the  Niger 
 Delta, communities were involved in this type of conflict long before  Nigeria’s 
independence. They have been common across different groups elsewhere 
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in Africa, as well, since before the advent of colonialism, with the issues 
instigating them mainly being economic and cultural in nature. 
In the contemporary Niger Delta, most recent conflicts between  communities 
have been mainly economic, with the struggle over land  ownership lying 
at their core. While this contention arises from the need for land for such 
 economic activities as farming and fishing, the presence of oil on some of the 
disputed lands increases the stakes by attracting patronage to  communities. 
The communities tend to engage in intense confrontation, often leading to 
violence, when crude oil is discovered on land that is already in dispute. 
Conflicts over land may also be caused by oil exploration activities or the 
construction of oil facilities or pipeline passages.
A typical example of violent intercommunal conflict in the Niger  Delta 
 predating the emergence of large-scale armed rebellion is the fighting 
 between the people of Koluama and Sangana in Bayelsa State, adjoining 
the Atlantic Ocean. These neighboring Ijaw communities on the Atlantic 
 coastline share not just territorial borders but also a common history. A 
lack of arable land in the area they occupy, however, and continuous erosion 
as a result of the ocean surge have caused their populations to move further 
inland in search of places to establish new settlements. This has often led 
to encroachment and trespass on lands from one community to the other.13 
Violent conflict arose between the Sangana and Koluama people over land 
ownership in Fish Town, a popular fishing settlement that had  historically 
been associated with the Sangana people of the Akassa clan. Although 
the settlers were from Sangana, Koluama people had made claims to the 
same land. On November 6, 1999, armed indigenes of the Koluama clan 
attacked Fish Town. Several settlers fled to Sangana town, thus  identifying 
 themselves as indigenes of Sangana community. In defense of their 
 community  members and their claim to the land, youths and leaders from 
 Sangana mobilized to confront Koluama indigenes, leading to further loss 
of lives and the destruction of properties in Koluama town.14
Although these events did not lead to the establishment of a criminal group 
or armed rebel group, they fueled the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons (SALWs) in that part of the Niger Delta, which, along with the 
 combat experience gained, played a fundamental role in the formation of 
armed rebel groups during the period when rebellion gained momentum. 
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For instance, MEND commander Ebikabowei Ben, also known as  General 
or  Boyloaf, established his rebel camp in Ezetu community, neighboring 
 Koluama. While not all the Koluama youths who had participated in the 
 intercommunity conflict joined the MEND rebel group, most of the  weapons 
used in that conflict had remained in the community.15 Those Koluama 
youths who did join the militant group in Ezetu were more prone to do so 
because of their experience in armed conflict. 
The point is that militant groups do not only recruit from their immediate 
communities; they also accept fighters from neighboring communities. In 
the case of the intercommunity conflict between the people of Koluama and 
Sangana, the implication is that membership in the Ezetu militant group 
makes the youths from Koluama community more powerful on the creeks 
and in the villages in the area than the Sangana youths, who did not join it. 
While no attack on Sangana during the militancy is on record, any possible 
attack would have involved the militants who were from Koluama. Thus, 
they would have fought not just as militants but as community warlords. 
Interethnic Conflict 
The history of ethnic groups in Nigeria has been one of  ethnic conflicts—a 
constant struggle for conquest and for  self- determination of each identity 
group within the area. In the Niger Delta, ethnic identities have been in con-
flict over natural resources and, in recent history, over  political issues that 
determine the distribution of resources. These conflicts have led to mobi-
lization for violence by the different ethnic groups involved, which has led 
to the militarization of some communities and  created the foundations for 
rebel mobilization in the region. The crisis between the Itsekiri and Ijaw is 
an example of rebel mobilization through interethnic  conflict. 
The violent conflict between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri started over the 
 relocation to Ogidigben (an Itsekiri community) of the headquarters of 
a  local government from Ogbe-Ijoh (an Ijaw community) in March 1997 
( Ukiwo 2006). Ijaw communities under the aegis of the Federation of Niger 
 Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) mobilized to confront the Itsekiri, whom 
they  accused of political domination (and marginalizing the Ijaw, who were 
greater in number), and the Itsekiri retaliated by confronting the Ijaws. This 
process generated more conflicts, sometimes resulting in fatalities, as both 
ethnic groups began to lay claim to land and creeks within the area. 
12
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The ownership of space within this area as a source of conflict between 
the  Itsekiri and Ijaw people is not new. In research carried out in 2009, 
interviewees in Ugborodo and Okerenkoko (Itsekiri and Ijaw villages, 
 respectively) revealed that indigenes of one village referred to members of 
neighboring or other communities by names the latter did not recognize. 
It was  subsequently discovered that the communities referred to by these 
“ different names” by the different ethnic groups are in dispute, with both 
groups  laying claim, particularly to the uninhabited land. These competing 
claims are a source of recurring conflicts.
The violent conflict between armed Ijaw and Itsekiri youths that claimed lives 
and properties, with many communities completely burned and  destroyed, 
left people of these communities with physical scars, and it  remains part 
of everyday political conversations, which are often prefaced by the phrase 
“before the crisis.” Although the conflict was resolved by state military 
 intervention, little was done to address its root causes and resolve historical 
disagreements between the affected ethnic nationalities. 
The Ijaw and Itsekiri conflict provided a narrative that led to the  mobilization 
of armed groups in the region (Ukiwo 2007). As hostilities against the 
 ethnic “other” ceased in Warri South West Local Government area,  Delta 
State, through state intervention, Ijaw youths  organized themselves and 
 participated in the resource-based activism that was  prevalent at the time. 
Their participation gained momentum as an Ijaw cause that attracted 
youths from all over the Niger Delta and provided the initial foundations for 
 nonstate violence in resource activism in the region. 
A case in point was popular Ijaw militant John Togo, who started as a fighter 
against the Itsekiri in March 1997. Initially a hunter working in the villages 
around Burutu area of Delta State, Nigeria, Togo joined the  campaign against 
the Itsekiri following the outbreak of the ethnic crisis in the  Gbaramatu area 
of Warri. He continued his participation in militant activities afterwards and 
became a prominent fighter due to his experience as a hunter and shooter. 
There is a shared  perception among people in the region that John Togo 
continued fighting owing to his belief that Ijaws were marginalized. Togo 
is also believed to have engaged in criminal activities leading to the death 
of fellow Ijaw after the Ijaw-Itsekiri crisis. Among those with knowledge of 
the issue, however, there is a consensus that the Ijaw-Itsekiri crisis was the 
primary reason he joined the armed struggle in the Niger Delta.16 
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Just like John Togo, many Ijaw youths saw that crisis as a question of  ethnic 
nationalism. Thus, the mobilization for violence against the state by those 
in the Warri area was seen by their communities as bravery, and the rebel 
groups that emerged as “freedom fighters.” They were joined by Ijaw youths 
from other regions who came to support them. Although the resource-based 
activism emerged from mainly Eastern and Central Niger Delta (Rivers 
State and Bayelsa State), the Ijaw from Western Delta brought to the fight 
experience gained from the violent struggle in their area, where they had 
fought against other ethnic groups in defense of their own. The perception 
was that the fight against the Nigerian state was similar to the fight against 
the Itsekiri ethnic group.
Political Violence
The return of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 led to an intense  competition for 
power among rival political parties and structures, and the 2003  elections 
provided a foundation for intense political violence in the Niger  Delta  region. 
Political parties and politicians mobilized and provided arms to youth gangs 
to support their political aspirations. To demonstrate their loyalty to these 
politicians, the youth gangs violently intimidated voters and  opposition 
 politicians, attacking perceived opponents and often annihilating them. 
This spate of political violence was observed in Rivers State, where youth 
gangs loyal to political parties were supported by politicians in causing 
mayhem among residents (Human Rights Watch 2007). The ruling People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) had recruited and armed youth gangs that helped 
the party rig the elections. After the elections, however, these gangs turned 
against each other and struggled for the control of political patronage and 
space in Port Harcourt. Although seen as a series of clashes between two 
rival youth groups, the conflict created a foundation for the emergence of 
rebel groups in the Niger Delta. One such clash took place in August 2004 
on the Njemanze waterfront between groups that later metamorphosed into 
the NDPVF, led by Asari Dokubo, and the NDV, led by Ateke Tom. The result 
was the destruction of lives and property (Human Rights Watch, 2007).
The arms and ammunition acquired by these youths during their  campaign for 
political violence provided the initial startup support to  carry out  large-scale 
violence targeting oil infrastructure and expatriate staff, and the continu-
ous engagement in criminal activities, such as oil theft and  hostage taking 
for ransom, increased their financial capacity. By 2005, these  erstwhile cult 
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groups recruited for political violence had fully evolved into rebel groups 
that fed into the overarching narrative of the state  marginalization of ethnic 
minorities in the Niger Delta.
Criminal Violence
The Niger Delta, like most parts of Nigeria, experiences criminal violence 
that undermines the security of citizens within the region. The insurgen-
cy has provided an umbrella for all forms of violence to thrive, including 
those associated with crime. As everyday criminal activity in the  community 
has increased, the rebel groups have also used acts inherently criminal 
in nature—such as armed robbery, kidnapping, and hostage taking—as 
 strategies to finance their operations (Ibaba 2011). The consequence is that 
it has become difficult to differentiate between criminal violence and the 
ongoing insurgency.
The line between criminal violence and the Niger Delta insurgency is  further 
blurred by the fact that some  individuals belong to both urban criminal 
 networks and the rebel groups, and their  connections with both are often 
used to perpetrate violence in different contexts. Often, they hide under the 
cover of the rebel groups to engage in criminal activities in urban areas. 
Thus, although many are responsible for everyday crime in the region, they 
are also seen as members of the rebel groups, which has  qualified them to 
benefit from the presidential amnesty and the DDR program.
Another criminal activity that has fueled conflict in the Niger Delta is  illegal 
oil bunkering (oil theft). While this was a major source of revenue for  militant 
groups in the region during the armed insurgency, they were not the only ones 
involved in it. As an activity, oil bunkering involves  multiple actors, including 
government officials, civil servants, politicians, and  security  personnel.17 
In recent times, entire communities have been known to  participate in the 
 illegal refining of oil that has been stolen from  transport  pipelines in the 
 region. Many local individuals involved in oil bunkering were not mainstream 
militants; their involvement in the process was for  economic gain. Yet, their 
participation has embedded them in the violent networks in the Niger Delta, 
placing them among the conflict actors in the region.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEBUILDING IN THE NIGER DELTA
Despite the implications the different forms of violence and conflict have 
for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, their existence has not influenced the 
current peacebuilding process there. This is a shortcoming that places the 
sustainability of peacebuilding in doubt. The current process is focused on 
the rebel-state conflicts, and the amnesty and DDR process initiated by the 
Nigerian government under late President Yar’adua was intended to end 
hostilities targeting the oil industry—an approach that did not take other 
forms of violence into account. Thus, although the hostilities toward the oil 
industry ceased, the other forms of conflict remained latent in the region.
Intracommunal, interethnic, and other forms of conflict created divisions 
within communities and between different ethnic groups that were only 
 overtaken by the rebel insurgency. These other conflicts were not decisively 
resolved, and key issues, such as the struggle for community leadership in 
intracommunal conflicts and the struggle for land in interethnic conflicts, 
remain unresolved to this day. That they were not taken into account by the 
amnesty and DDR process makes it a shortsighted one, focusing on the 
eventual outcome of a long, nonlinear conflict process instead of dealing 
with the root causes of the different trajectories of violence that lead to 
large-scale insurgency against the state.
These conflicts that predate the rebel-state insurgency are beginning to 
 resurface in the Niger Delta. Communities and areas where the rebellion 
took a manifest role are currently experiencing renewed forms of violent 
conflict at the local level. Yet again, these are not reported as crucial to 
the stability of the region and Nigeria at large. They are, rather, reported 
as localized issues, with no attention paid to the fact that the armed rebel 
insurgency in the Niger Delta was fueled by them.
The amnesty and DDR decriminalized all rebels without taking into  account 
the different routes these individuals took to radicalization. It did not take 
into account the fact that some emerged as community warlords,  others as 
political thugs, and some as members of criminal syndicates. It also went 
ahead to offer amnesty to opportunists who had participated in  criminal 
 activities in urban centers, who then took part in the amnesty and DDR 
 process as “free riders” (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012). Upon acceptance of 
 amnesty and DDR, these individuals return to the society to face the same 
challenges that had fueled their violent indoctrination. 
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The struggle for leadership and land in communities is still part of the 
 socioeconomic and political struggle in the Niger Delta communities 
from which ex-rebels are not insulated, despite their participation in the 
 amnesty and DDR program. This has been demonstrated recently in repeats 
of  confrontations in two communities that had militant groups: Peremabiri 
and Warri. 
The history of the NDV-affiliated militant group that emerged in  Peremabiri 
highlights how the privileging of militants in the Niger Delta conflict  discourse 
undermines the understanding of other actors who are not  participants in 
the rebel-state violence. The emergence of one of the key actors in this 
community conflict as a militant leader, recognized by  government and 
empowered by arms, suppressed other factions in the  community that had 
participated in the conflict, thus giving him the opportunity to dominate 
 community politics and governance structures—the contentious issues that 
had led to the communal conflict to begin with.
The amnesty and DDR process led to the “civilianization” of armed rebels in 
Peremabiri and thus gave other factions of the conflicts that predate rebel 
insurgency an opening to reassert themselves in community governance. 
The ex-rebel group would not relinquish governance voluntarily,  however. 
This set off a bitter struggle for power between ex-rebels and other 
 indigenes that has claimed at least one life and led to a gun battle between 
the two groups (Vanguard News 2014). Other youth groups revolted against 
the continuing dominance of the NDV leader, who was forced away from the 
community by this attack and has not since returned.18
This renewed confrontation between different youth factions in  Peremabiri 
over community politics and leadership issues similar to those that were 
previously in dispute demonstrates that the conflict that produced the 
 NDV- affiliated leader still exists there. Hostilities might seem to have ceased 
and peace to have returned, but in visits to the community in  J anuary 2014 
and November 2014,19 I found these tensions persist. Community members 
and victims recount their ordeal during the crisis that predates the militia 
insurgency, focusing on the communal conflicts instead of on the dominant 
rebel insurgency that informed the amnesty and DDR.20 Unlike the  Nigerian 
state and, to a large extent, the academic literature on the Niger Delta 
 conflict, the local people are more concerned with the conflict narratives that 
affect their personal lives. Since these narratives differ from  community to 
community, a peacebuilding effort that focuses on the  overarching narrative 
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of rebel insurgency without paying attention to the nuanced and contextual 
issues in each community cannot be seen as sustainable.
The recurrence of conflicts in the Niger Delta has not been limited to 
 intracommunal disputes. This same challenge has been presented by 
 conflicts with an interethnic dimension in the Warri axis of the Niger Delta. 
The insurgency gave the armed rebels an advantage in the power structure 
in the Niger Delta, as they controlled communities and posed a threat to 
oil infrastructure and production. During its height (from January 2006 to 
 August 2009), rebel attacks reduced oil production dramatically and forced 
the federal government to adopt a “carrot and stick” approach. The stick 
was direct military assault on rebel positions, and the carrot was indirect 
communications between politicians and representatives of oil companies 
that aimed to pacify the rebels so they would cease hostilities toward the 
oil companies. The pacification included the rebels’ empowerment through 
cash inducement and political patronage, which gave them a political 
 advantage over other groups with whom they had been in conflict. 
This advantage is seen in the dominance of the Ijaws in the struggles in 
the Warri area. Although both the Ijaw and Itsekiri shared  experiences 
in development deficits and oil industry–induced pollution in the area, 
the  predominance of Ijaw youths who had previously participated in the 
 interethnic conflict there made the Ijaw the critical stakeholders in the 
peace process. Ultimately, the opportunities they gained from the rebellion 
 suppressed other ethnic rivalries against them. The Ijaw youths were better 
armed and had a standing army of fighters that would more likely emerge 
victorious in any outbreak of interethnic violence.  
In the aftermath of the insurgency, however, the struggle between the 
Ijaws and Itsekiris over the ownership of land and the location of the  local 
 government headquarters of the Warri South West Local Government area 
resurfaced, thus renewing the possibilities for violence over the same 
 issues. When the Federal Government of Nigeria proposed to construct 
a  multibillion dollar gas project in the Gbaramatu and Ugborodo areas of 
Delta State, the Itsekiri claimed complete ownership of the land, while the 
Ijaw argued that part of it belonged to Ijaw communities (O’Neil 2014). This 
disagreement was based on contradictory claims to land within Gbaramatu 
clan (particularly a place named Ikpokpo) in Delta State. The dispute is being 
led by two prominent leaders in those conflicts,  Government Ekpemupolo 
aka Tompolo (Ijaw) and Ayirimi Emami aka Akulagba (Itsekiri),21 and it has 
18
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL | WORKING PAPERS EBIEDE | BEYOND THE REBELLION
delayed the takeoff of the gas project. Ayirimi Emami’s claim that the land 
belonged to the Itsekiri  before it was  annexed by the Ijaw demonstrates 
that, although the interethnic  hostilities have ceased, the grievances and 
issues behind the conflicts remain  unresolved.
The current struggle over the ownership of land could lead to another spate 
of interethnic violence in the Warri area—a situation arising from the  failure 
of the peace process to take into account these unsettled grievances. By 
focusing on the rebels in the area, the amnesty and DDR process further 
empowered them over their previous rivals. Yet, the “civilianization” of 
these armed rebels opened up the space for those rivals to confront them 
in the face of a dispute in the region. This situation emphasizes the need for 
ex-rebels who are aligned with the Ijaw ethnic group to remain prepared for 
confrontations with other ethnic groups if the need arises.
In short, the peacebuilding process has been far from comprehensive. It has 
not addressed the root causes of conflict, nor has it addressed all forms of 
conflict in the Niger Delta. Instead, it has focused on the rebels in the region 
because of the insurgency’s direct impact on the oil industry, and for this 
reason it will prove unsustainable.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis highlights the shortcomings of the current  peacebuilding 
process in the Niger Delta. It demonstrates that the focus on main  cleavages 
often misleads policymakers and scholars in the analysis of  conflicts and also 
in proferring solutions to the challenges facing sustainable  peacebuilding. 
In the Niger Delta, the misdiagnosis and shortsighted policy  interventions 
that focus on the rebel-state insurgency are largely  influenced by the 
 desperation to stabilize the oil industry without addressing the root causes 
of the conflicts and by the different conflict narratives in the Niger Delta.
Further research to determine how these different narratives of  conflict 
manifest in the aftermath of the amnesty and DDR process is  crucial to 
 understanding the “post-conflict” situation in the Niger Delta. Also  important 
is to find new solutions for addressing the internal conflicts in the  region, 
which laid the foundation for mobilization of rebel groups against the state. 
It is not enough to address the attack on the Nigerian state; the state must 
also initiate a comprehensive peacebuilding process that addresses all 
forms of violent conflict in the Niger Delta.
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NOTES
1. Interview with community member (1) in Peremabiri, Bayelsa State, on January 22, 2014. 
2. Interview with community chief (3) in Peremabiri, Bayelsa State, January 19, 2014.
  
3. Interview with Community Development Committee (CDC) member (1), Peremabiri, 
Bayelsa State, January 19, 2014.
  
4. Interview with CDC member (2), Peremabiri, Bayelsa State, January 22, 2014.
  
5. Interview with community chief (3), Yenagoa, February 20, 2014.
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6. Interview with community youth leader, Peremabiri, January 30, 2014.
  
7. Interview with community member (5), Peremabiri, January 16, 2014.
  
8. Interview with ex-militant (1), Yenagoa, December 29, 2013.
  
9. About 150,000 USD.
  
10. Interview with ex-militant (1), Yenagoa, December 29, 2013.
  
11. This is a pseudonym for an ex-militant leader. I have used it in this work to protect the 
informants that participated in my research. 
  
12. Interview with ex-militant (1), Yenagoa, December 29, 2013.
  
13. It is noteworthy that other coastline communities in Bayelsa State, such as Agei, Ezetu, 
Fish Town, and Foropa, share cordial relations. The difference between their relations and 
those between Koluama and Sangana is that the latter two share a land boundary, while 
the others are far from each other and separated by tributaries and rivers.
  
14. Utusan Online, “Residents Return as Hope Grows for End to Nigeria’s `Delta Wars,’” 
November 20, 2001, http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2001&dt=1120&pub= 
 Utusan_Express&sec=  Features&pg=fe_02.htm#ixzz3SxcatWKc.
15. This became an issue during the amnesty and DDR process, which was an  opportunity 
to get rid of the SALWs in the area.
  
16. Private conversations with former MEND member, January 10, 2015.
  
17. “The Amnesty, Illegal Oil Bunkering and Local Refining,” roundtable report and  briefing 
note, UK Niger Delta Study Group, University of Oxford, England, September 28, 2012.
  
18. Interview with CDC member, Peremabiri, November 20, 2014.
 
19. I conducted field research in Peremabiri under the PhD project “Reintegration of Ex- 
militants as a Condition for Sustainable Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta?” from  December 
2013 to February 2014 and October 2014 to January 2015.
  
20. This is seen in interviews I conducted across different villages in the Niger Delta.
  
21. Tompolo became the prominent warlord and general leader of MEND in the Niger Delta.
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